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The U.S. Embargo 
against Cuba and the 
Diplomatic Challenges to 
Extraterritoriality
Joy Gordon
Many analysts have criticized the U.S. embargo against Cuba as 
an anachronistic holdover from the Cold War. Yet its problems go well 
beyond that. In many regards, the U.S. embargo against Cuba represents a 
caricature of the various American misapplications of economic sanctions: 
if the goal is to end the Castro regime this policy has not only failed, but 
has spent half a century doing so. If the intent is to support Cubans in 
their aspirations for a different political system the sanctions have failed in 
that regard as well, since even the most vocal dissidents in Cuba criticize 
the embargo. In the face of the “smart sanctions” movement to develop 
economic tools that target the leadership rather than the people, the 
embargo against Cuba represents the opposite pole: it impacts the Cuban 
population indiscriminately, affecting everything from family travel, to the 
publication of scientific articles by Cuban scholars, to the cost of buying 
chicken for Cuban households. 
This article will briefly describe the history and the main compo-
nents of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, and the impact of the unilateral 
measures on Cuba’s economy. It will look at some of the ways in which 
the U.S. embargo is “extraterritorial”—impacting Cuba’s trade with third 
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countries—as well as ways in which the United States’ unilateral embargo 
functions in effect as a global measure. It will then examine the over-
whelming response of the international community, and in particular, the 
United Nations General Assembly, in condemning the embargo as a viola-
tion of international law. This response represents a diplomatic challenge 
to the United States that is unparalleled in the last fifty years of global 
governance.
THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
The U.S. embargo against Cuba began when President Eisenhower 
severed ties with Cuba in early 1961 under the Trading with the Enemy Act 
(TWEA) which allowed the president to impose economic sanctions on a 
hostile country during wartime “or any other period of national emergency 
declared by the President.” Later that year, Congress passed the Foreign 
Assistance Act banning all aid to communist countries. Under its authority, in 
1962, President Kennedy issued a proclamation which prohibited “the impor-
tation into the United States of all goods of Cuban origin and goods imported 
from or through Cuba.” This was the original framework for the embargo.
The Cuban Assets Controls Regulations (CACR), issued under 
the TWEA, authorized the Treasury Department to regulate commercial 
transactions. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) issues the specific regulations that implement the embargo. These 
regulations have varied to some extent with changes in administration. 
However, the discretion of the President to remove or alter the terms of 
the embargo was limited when Congress passed two additional laws in the 
1990s, the “Cuba Democracy Act” and the “Liberated Act,” which further 
tightened the embargo. In 2000, Congress passed the Trade Sanctions 
Reform and Export Enhancement Act providing limited exceptions to the 
embargo, primarily by allowing U.S. companies to sell agricultural and 
medical products to Cuba, subject to a number of limitations. In addition, 
there are other measures, outside the embargo legislation and regulations, 
that have the effect of tightening the embargo further, such as the restric-
tions on selling technology to countries the United States considers to be 
“state sponsors of terrorism”, and the denial of visas to Cubans who wish to 
visit the United States for personal or professional reasons. 
The embargo not only deprives Cuba of access to U.S. markets and 
goods, but interferes in its trade with third countries; prohibits U.S. dollar 
transactions, even with banks and trade partners in third countries; prohibits 
most travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens; interferes in Cuba’s internet access and 
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roaming agreements for cell phones; denies Cuba access to global financial 
institutions; prohibits the sale of equipment to Cuban research scientists by 
U.S. companies or their foreign subsidiaries; prevents Cubans from visiting 
family members in the United States; 
and often blocks scientific and cultural 
exchanges. Other embargoes, such as 
the Security Council sanctions imposed 
on Iraq in the 1990s, have caused greater 
humanitarian harm than the U.S. 
embargo against Cuba. Yet, in some 
regards the U.S. measures against Cuba 
are far more extensive, affecting every 
aspect of commerce, travel, economic 
development, and even humanitarian 
contributions. Overall, Cuba estimates 
the total damages from the U.S. embargo to be in excess of $100 billion.1 
UNILATERAL MEASURES
Conventional wisdom holds that multilateral embargoes are more 
effective than unilateral embargoes. But while U.S. unilateral measures have 
not been effective at ending the Castro regime, they have had a far greater 
impact on Cuba’s economy and society than would ordinarily be expected 
of a unilateral trade embargo. This is partly because the United States would 
be Cuba’s largest and closest trading partner, and the lack of access to U.S. 
markets means that Cuba is excluded from buying a broad range of U.S. 
goods that cost less to buy and transport than comparable goods produced 
elsewhere in the world. According to a study by the Congressional Research 
Service, imports to Cuba were 30 percent higher overall as a result of the 
embargo.2 For example, Braille machines produced in the United States, 
used for teaching blind and partially sighted children, are significantly less 
expensive than those produced elsewhere. Consequently, Cuba’s costs when 
it buys Braille machines for schools are $1100 per machine, rather than 
$700 for the machines produced in the United States.3 Likewise, because 
cytostatic serums, used to treat certain types of malignant tumors, cannot 
be purchased from U.S. companies, Cuba buys them from Europe or 
Asia, or through third countries, which significantly increases their costs.4 
Additionally, according to the UN Human Settlements Program, Cuba’s 
inability to purchase construction materials from U.S. sources adversely 
affects cost and logistics to such a degree that it undermines the availability 
In some regards the U.S. 
measures against Cuba 
are far more extensive, 
affecting every aspect of 
commerce, travel, economic 
development, and even 
humanitarian contributions.
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of adequate housing in Cuba. On one occasion, this lack of access to cheap 
U.S. materials compromised Cuba’s “response to housing reconstruction 
needs resulting from destructive hurricanes in 2001 and 2002, in both 
cases primarily affecting the most vulnerable sectors of the population.”5 
Thus, even as a unilateral measure, the fact that the embargo denies Cuba 
access to U.S. markets is itself costly and damaging to the Cuban economy. 
Even cultural exchanges between the two countries are affected by 
the embargo and related measures. Under the Bush administration, Cuban 
artists, musicians, scientists, and scholars were routinely denied visas to come 
to the United States to attend professional conferences, to perform their 
music, or to attend a gallery opening when their art was exhibited. There 
were harsh restrictions on family visits. There were regulatory roadblocks 
making it prohibitively difficult for U.S. universities to establish academic 
partnerships with Cuban universities. The Obama administration has eased 
up on some of these, allowing greater family travel and issuing more visas 
for artists and professionals, but most of the restrictions remain in place. 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The U.S. embargo is not limited to unilateral measures of the sort 
described above. The embargo is also extraterritorial: it interferes in Cuba’s 
trade with companies located in third countries. The Torricelli and Helms-
Burton laws greatly increased the extraterritorial impact of the embargo, 
and they came at a time when Cuba’s economic situation was particularly 
precarious. Eighty-five percent of Cuba’s trade had been with the Eastern 
bloc, and in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba made 
drastic changes in its economy. In 1991, Cuba rapidly began establishing 
new trading partners, focusing on Canada, Mexico, Europe, and Latin 
America. Thus, the extraterritorial measures imposed by the United States 
were particularly damaging at the juncture when Cuba was working as 
quickly as possible to establish new trade relations. 
In 1992, Congress passed the “Cuban Democracy Act,” introduced 
by Senator Robert Torricelli.6 Since 1975, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
corporations had routinely been given licenses to trade with Cuba, as long 
as the subsidiary functioned independently of the parent corporation and 
no U.S. goods or U.S. dollar transactions were involved.7 The Torricelli 
law prohibited these licenses, with the result that foreign subsidiaries 
were treated the same as U.S. corporations, with violators subject to the 
same penalties as U.S. companies. This constituted a clear international 
law, which holds that “a company is ordinarily considered to be a national 
67
vol.36:1 winter 2012
THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA AND 
THE DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY
of the state under the laws of which it is organized.”8 In addition, the 
Torricelli law imposed restrictions on shipping: any vessel that enters Cuba 
to provide goods or services, regardless of the country of origin, cannot 
stop at a U.S. port for 180 days; otherwise, both the ship and its cargo are 
subject to confiscation. This applies even to goods that the United States 
considers permissible such as Cuban imports of food from third countries.
The Torricelli law also prohibits third countries from selling goods 
to the United States that contain any amount of Cuban materials or any 
materials that have passed through Cuba.9 For example, no metal products 
can be sold to the United States that 
contain even trace amounts of Cuban 
nickel, one of Cuba’s major exports. 
Likewise, no Belgian chocolate may 
be sold in the United States unless the 
Belgian government provides assur-
ances to the U.S. government that the 
chocolate contains no Cuban sugar, 
an export that is critical to the Cuban 
economy.10 
In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act, 
known as the “Libertad Act,”11 added 
other extraterritorial provisions. Title 
III of the act stipulates that foreign 
companies that invest in Cuban prop-
erties that were nationalized by the 
Cuban state after the Revolution are 
subject to suit by the original owners, 
if they are now U.S. nationals, in U.S. 
courts.12 Thus, a former Cuban citizen 
who owned a plantation in Cuba in 
the 1950s could now sue a Spanish hotel chain that built a hotel on that 
land in 2010, if the ex-Cuban is now a U.S. citizen. In addition, Title IV 
provides that the officers and executives of companies using or investing in 
those Cuban properties, and their families, may be barred from entering 
the United States.13 The Helms-Burton Act also prohibits the import of 
any goods that are of Cuban origin, in whole or in part, or were manufac-
tured or produced in Cuba, in any part, or were ever located in or trans-
ported from or through Cuba. These restrictions apply not only to goods 
imported into the United States, but to transactions that take place entirely 
outside the United States.14 
For example, no metal 
products can be sold to the 
United States that contain 
even trace amounts of Cuban 
nickel, one of Cuba’s major 
exports. Likewise, no Belgian 
chocolate may be sold in 
the United States unless the 
Belgian government provides 
assurances to the U.S. 
government that the chocolate 
contains no Cuban sugar, an 
export that is critical to the 
Cuban economy.
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IMPACTS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES
International banking
The U.S. embargo measures interfere in Cuba’s access to international 
banks in several ways, even when they are not U.S. financial institutions. 
The United States prohibits Cuba from engaging in any transactions in 
U.S. dollars, and likewise prohibits any bank—including foreign banks— 
from facilitating commercial transactions by Cuba in U.S. dollars. In 
recent years, particularly under the Bush administration, the United States 
has enforced the banking provisions aggressively. The United States fined 
the Swiss bank UBS $100 million for engaging in U.S. dollar transactions 
with Cuba, and also imposed smaller fines on Italian and Spanish banks. 
In 2006, the United States blacklisted the Dutch bank, UNG, which had 
done business in Cuba for over a decade; the following year UNG termi-
nated its banking operations in Cuba.15 In 2009, the Treasury Department 
imposed a fine of $5.75 million on the Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group, Ltd., for financial transactions involving Cuba and Sudan, and also 
fined Credit Suisse Bank almost half a billion dollars for financial transac-
tions involving Cuba and other countries subject to U.S. embargoes.16 
By 2007, in spite of their own national legislation prohibiting compli-
ance with the U.S. embargo, a number of major Canadian and European 
banks stopped doing business with Cuba including Barclays, the Bank of 
Nova Scotia, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, and 
HSBC.17 These measures impede Cuba’s commerce in a number of ways. 
For many transactions, there are additional costs in using currencies other 
than the dollar. Because so many major international banks no longer 
provide banking services to Cuba out of fear of U.S. retaliation, Cuba has 
had to turn to other banks, which charge higher rates for their services. 
For 1998, a State Department official maintained that, because of U.S. 
measures, interest rates for financing Cuban development projects reached 
22 percent.18 In 2009, Cuba estimated that the losses related to financing 
costs attributable to the embargo came to $164 million.19
International mergers and acquisitions
The extraterritoriality impact of the U.S. embargo expands further 
when U.S. companies acquire or merge with foreign companies, since the 
Torricelli law treats these new subsidiaries as U.S. entities. For example, 
Cuba contracted with the German company, Bayer, to buy pesticides. After 
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Bayer began manufacturing one of the ingredients in the United States, it 
sought a license from the United States to continue exporting the pesti-
cides to Cuba but was denied. Bayer then cancelled its contract with Cuba. 
Likewise, Cuba had a longstanding business relation with Sanachem, a 
South African company. After the U.S. company Dow Chemical bought 
shares in Sanachem, the South African company no longer sold goods 
to Cuba.20 On another occasion, a British company which had agreed to 
sell meteorological equipment to Cuba, Pascall Electronics Limited, was 
acquired by the U.S. company EMRISE. Cuba’s purchase from the British 
company was cancelled after the U.S. government denied EMRISE a 
license.21 
The impact is particularly visible in Cuba’s medical and biotech-
nology sectors. Indeed, this is an explicit priority of the Torricelli law, which 
provides that while exceptions may be granted to allow sales of medicines 
and medical supplies, even those are not permitted if they “could be used in 
the production of any biotechnological product.”22 For example, in 1995, 
Cuba lost access to medical goods when “the U.S. company Upjohn merged 
with the Swedish firm Pharmacia, which since 1970 had been selling 
medical equipment, reagents, chemotherapy drugs, and other products 
to a Cuban company. Cuba also lost an important supplier of diagnostic 
materials when Wisconsin’s Sybron International acquired Germany’s Nuc. 
Sales of pacemakers for heart patients were suddenly halted when Siemens 
of Sweden and Teletronics Pacing System of Australia transferred produc-
tion and ownership to the United States.”23 
The mergers, in in conjunction with the measures targeting Cuba’s 
medical and biotech industries, affect not only the activities of Cuban 
institutions, but also the work of international humanitarian organizations 
in Cuba. In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) had purchased 
certain radioactive isotopes used to treat malignant tumors in the Cuban 
population from the Canadian company MDS Nordion. The WHO could 
no longer do so after MDS Nordion was acquired by the U.S. company 
Varian Medical Systems.24 In 2004, when the WHO sought to buy labora-
tory reagents to provide medical services in Cuba from the British company 
Oxoid, it could not, because Oxoid had been acquired by a U.S. company.25 
Global effects
In some regards, because of the extraordinary power held by the 
United States in many domains, the U.S. unilateral embargo functions as 
a global embargo. The Helms-Burton Act effectively blocks Cuba’s access 
the fletcher forum of world affairs
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to global financial institutions—including the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank—by requiring 
the U.S. representatives on their boards 
to vote against granting Cuba member-
ship or access to loans or development 
funds. Because voting is weighted, it is 
nearly impossible for any of these orga-
nizations to admit Cuba or provide 
loans or development aid. In the IMF, 
the United States holds almost 17 
percent of the votes; only three other 
countries—France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom—hold more than 
4 percent of the votes. By contrast, over 90 countries hold 0.1 percent 
of the vote or less.26 The World Bank has roughly the same structure.27 
In the unlikely event that the U.S. vote is not sufficient to deny Cuba 
access to financing from the organization, the Helms-Burton Act would 
then imposes punitive measures: if the institution were to somehow extend 
loans or aid to Cuba, the United States will reduce its contribution to that 
institution by the same amount.28 
Cuba’s lack of access to major global financial institutions has been 
particularly damaging in the context of Cuba’s economic crisis, “increasing 
the difficulties of negotiating debt settlements and credit with public and 
commercial creditors, including Paris Club creditors.”29 The UN coordi-
nator of aid activities in Cuba notes that, while it is difficult to quantify 
the effect of this exclusion, “Cuba is one of the few countries in the world 
facing a deep restructuring of its economy without assistance from interna-
tional financial institutions.”30 
There are also other ways in which the U.S. embargo effectively 
excludes Cuba from global financial networks. For example, international 
monetary transfers between banks take place through a network called the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) 
system. Without access to this system, it is not possible to wire money or 
deposit a check sent from another country. The SWIFT system has released 
new software which will be the only means of accessing the system starting 
in March 2012. The SWIFT network has informed Cuba that it will 
not provide Cuba with this software, “because it contains United States 
technologies and components subject to the restrictions of the economic 
embargo.”31 
In some regards, because of 
the extraordinary power held 
by the United States in many 
domains, the U.S. unilateral 
embargo functions as a 
global embargo. 
71
vol.36:1 winter 2012
THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA AND 
THE DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY
THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Retaliatory legislation
The intrusiveness of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the 1996 
Libertad Act created a backlash among American allies, and a number of 
major American trading partners responded with retaliatory legislation. 
After the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, Canada’s Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien denounced it as interference in Canada’s affairs: “If you want to 
have an isolationist policy, that’s your business. But don’t tell us what to 
do. That’s our business.”32 Canada additionally denounced the U.S. law as 
a violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the 
grounds that the U.S. Congress was seeking to impose its foreign policy 
on other nations,33 and initiated a complaint under NAFTA procedures.34 
Canada also responded by passing an amendment to its Foreign Extra-
Territorial Measures Act (FEMA): in the event that a plaintiff obtained 
a judgment against a Canadian national under the Helms-Burton Act, 
the “clawback legislation” authorized Canada’s attorney general to block 
enforcement. FEMA also imposed penalties of up to 1 million Canadian 
dollars on Canadian nationals if they complied with the Helms-Burton 
Act. Similarly, Mexico responded with retaliatory legislation, which went 
into effect in October 1996. Like FEMA, Mexico’s Law for Protection of 
Trade and Investment prohibits compliance with extraterritorial measures, 
authorizes Mexican courts to decline to recognize judgments issued by 
U.S. courts under the Helms-Burton Act, and authorizes Mexicans subject 
to such judgments to bring suit in Mexican court for compensation.35 
The European Union took a similar course in response to Helms-
Burton. A European Council regulation stated: “The U.S. has enacted 
laws that purport to regulate activities of persons under the jurisdiction 
of the member states of the European Union; this extra-territorial appli-
cation violates international law and has adverse effects on the interest of 
the European Union.”36 In addition, the EU brought an action against the 
United States before the newly-minted World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in February 1997, for interfering in trade in violation of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In its defense, the United States 
argued that the Helms-Burton Act was a matter of national security, and 
therefore exempt from GATT.37 The United States then maintained that, 
having asserted the Helms-Burton Act was a matter of national security, 
no WTO panel could review that determination or question its validity.38 
The matter nearly created an institutional crisis for the new organization: 
the fletcher forum of world affairs
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if any nation could claim exemption for national security, using its judg-
ment to determine for itself what constituted “national security,” then the 
WTO as an institution of global governance and dispute resolution would 
be profoundly undermined. Ultimately, the matter was resolved diplomati-
cally when the Clinton administration agreed to suspend the enforcement 
of Titles III and IV, and work with Congress to repeal the legislation. In 
return, the EU did not pursue its action before the WTO.
Despite the “clawback” legislation adopted by Canada, Mexico, and 
the EU, there were nevertheless cancellations of significant foreign invest-
ment projects, particularly in the first few years after the Helms-Burton Act 
went into effect. CEMEX, a Mexican company, cancelled a joint venture 
with Cuba for cement production; Redpath, a Canadian sugar refiner that 
had been purchasing 100,000 tons of sugar from Cuba per year, withdrew 
from Cuba; and British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate cancelled an explora-
tion project in Cuba.39
Statements of condemnation
In addition to the WTO action and retaliatory legislation by 
Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, U.S. embargo measures have 
also met broad, consistent international condemnation. In 2009 and 2010, 
for example, statements of condemnation came from the XV Summit of 
the Non-Aligned Movement held in Egypt in 2009,40 the II Africa-South 
America Summit (ASA) in 2009,41 the VII Summit of the countries of the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of the Americas (ALBA) in 2009,42 the 
Unity Summit of 2010, consisting of the XXI Rio Group Summit and 
the II Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and 
Development (CALC),43 and the VI Summit of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and the European Union.44 
UN General Assembly resolutions
It is not surprising that Cuba would have support from the devel-
oping world, particularly its trading partners in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. A more dramatic demonstration of the breadth of international 
opposition to the legality of the U.S. embargo legislation was the series 
of annual votes before the UN General Assembly, which began in 1992. 
After the Torricelli law was passed, Cuba introduced a resolution before 
the UN General Assembly that called upon member states not to imple-
ment its provisions and expressed concern about the extraterritorial effects 
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and their consequent violation of the principle of equal sovereignty.45 The 
resolution passed by a vote of 59 to 3, with 71 abstentions and 46 nations 
not voting. International support for 
Cuba’s resolutions has grown steadily 
from 1992 through the present, as 
states that had abstained in one year 
voted “yes” the next, and then continue 
to do so each year. While the 1992 
resolution had 59 votes in favor, the 
next year’s resolution had 88 votes in 
favor, 4 opposed, and 92 abstaining or 
not voting.46 For each of the last several 
years, over 180 members—out of 193 
in the United Nations—have joined 
Cuba in condemning this U.S. violation of international trade law. Most 
recently, in October 2011, 186 countries voted in support of Cuba’s resolu-
tion, two opposed it, and three abstained.
The only nation that has consistently joined the United States in 
voting against the resolutions has been Israel, the highest recipient of U.S. 
foreign aid amounting to $3 billion annually.47 The United States and Israel 
are typically joined by, at most, one or two other states in opposing the 
Cuban resolution. Last fall, only the United States and Israel voted against 
the measure, while Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia abstained 
— all of them dependent on the United States.
The annual resolutions call upon member states “to refrain from 
promulgating and applying laws and measures” such as the Helms-Burton 
Act, and request the Secretary General to prepare a report on the imple-
mentation of the resolutions. Consequently, each year the Secretary General 
has produced a report incorporating information from member states and 
international organizations regarding their compliance with the resolution. 
In these reports, Cuba provides detailed lists of the particular transactions 
that were canceled or affected by the embargo, as well as an estimate of the 
financial cost of its damages. Some nations simply state that they are in 
compliance and have normal commercial relations with Cuba, while others 
provide a more extensive statement of condemnation. In the 2010 report, 
for example, Burundi responded, “Burundi has never enforced the embargo 
against the Republic of Cuba,”48 whereas countries with strong commer-
cial or political ties to Cuba provide additional commentary. Bolivia, for 
example, states, “the embargo is a criminal policy which, according to very 
conservative estimates, has caused losses of over $230 billion since it was 
International support for 
Cuba’s resolutions has grown 
steadily from 1992 through 
the present, as states that had 
abstained in one year voted 
“yes” the next, and then 
continue to do so each year.
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imposed almost 50 years ago, constituting an unlawful act from every view-
point.”49 The EU comments each year on its agreement with the Clinton 
administration, which had agreed to take certain measures in exchange for 
the withdrawal of the EU’s WTO complaint: 
[O]n 18 May 1998, at the European Union/United States Summit 
in London, a package was agreed covering waivers to titles III and 
IV of the Helms-Burton Act; a commitment by the United States 
administration to resist future extraterritorial legislation of that kind; 
and an understanding with respect to disciplines for the strength-
ening of investment protection. 50 
Each year, the EU states rather pointedly that it “continues to urge 
the United States to implement its side of the Understanding of 18 May 
1998.”51
CONCLUSION
Security Council resolutions are often said to represent “the interna-
tional community.” Formally, this is correct because the UN Charter autho-
rizes the Security Council to act on behalf of the international community, 
and member states are signatories to the Charter.52 But of course, the 
Council is a counter-majoritarian institution, consisting of only fifteen 
members with no permanent representation from the Arab world, Africa, 
or Latin America. Internally, the Council is also counter-majoritarian in 
that any of the permanent members can veto a measure even if every other 
member of the Council supports it. Thus, the Council can only repre-
sent “the international community” in 
a republican sense, while its positions 
may in fact diverge from those of the 
majority of nations, or the majority of 
the world’s population.
By contrast, a vote in the General 
Assembly, as a democratic body with 
equal representation for all member 
states, is an explicit, direct expres-
sion of “the will of the international 
community.” The disparity between 
the Security Council, which is so thor-
oughly dominated by the permanent 
members, and the General Assembly, is particularly evident in the case of 
the U.S. embargo against Cuba. The Security Council presumably could 
It is striking that Cuba has 
achieved such extraordinary 
support from nearly every 
nation in the international 
community, all of whom 
have nothing to gain and 
everything to lose by risking 
the wrath of the U.S.
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never castigate the U.S. for any action it took under any circumstances, 
given the veto power held by the U.S. But in the General Assembly—a 
venue that operates democratically, and where the U.S. holds no extraordi-
nary powers—it is clear that the opposition is nearly universal. It is striking 
that Cuba has achieved such extraordinary support from nearly every 
nation in the international community, all of whom have nothing to gain 
and everything to lose by risking the wrath of the U.S.
For decades, American administrations have consistently portrayed 
the Cuban regime as isolated and marginalized by the international 
community for its human rights record. But in the case of the American 
embargo against Cuba, it seems that the international community is nearly 
unanimous in the view that it is the United States that has little respect 
for international law and global governance. This is evident from the chal-
lenges within the WTO; retaliatory legislation from Mexico, Canada, and 
the European Union; broad diplomatic denunciations in Africa, Latin 
America, and the Caribbean; and the annual UN General Assembly votes 
of condemnation. The fact that nearly all U.S. allies and trading partners 
endorse Cuba’s condemnation of the United States, and have done so every 
year for almost two decades, says a great deal about the global opinion of 
the American actions. n
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APPENDIX
UN General Assembly Votes on Cuba Embargo-Related Resolutions,  
1992-2011
Year Votes in favor Abstentions Votes opposed
1992 59 71 3
1993 88 57 4
1994 101 48 2
1995 117 38 3
1996 137 25 3
1997 143 17 3
1998 157 12 2
1999 155 8 2
2000 167 4 3
2001 167 3 3
2002 173 4 3
2003 179 3 3
2004 179 1 4
2005 182 1 4
2006 183 1 4
2007 184 1 4
2008 185 2 3
2009 187 2 3
2010 187 3 2
2011 186 3 2
